Free Ride, Take It Easy: An Empirical Analysis of Adverse Incentives Caused by Revenue Sharing by Rascher, Daniel A.
The University of San Francisco
USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center
Kinesiology (Formerly Exercise and Sport Science) College of Arts and Sciences
2011
Free Ride, Take It Easy: An Empirical Analysis of
Adverse Incentives Caused by Revenue Sharing
Daniel A. Rascher
University of San Francisco, RASCHER@USFCA.EDU
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.usfca.edu/ess
Part of the Sports Management Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts and Sciences at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kinesiology (Formerly Exercise and Sport Science) by an authorized administrator of USF
Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rascher, Daniel A., "Free Ride, Take It Easy: An Empirical Analysis of Adverse Incentives Caused by Revenue Sharing" (2011).
Kinesiology (Formerly Exercise and Sport Science). Paper 22.
http://repository.usfca.edu/ess/22
373
Journal of Sport Management, 2011, 25, 373-390
© 2011 Human Kinetics, Inc.
management and marketing
Rascher is with the Dept. of Sport Management, University of 
San Francisco, San Francisco, CA. Nagel and Brown are with 
the Dept. of Sport and Entertainment Management, University 
of South Carolina, Columbia, SC. McEvoy is with the School 
of Kinesiology and Recreation, Illinois State University, 
Normal, IL.
Free Ride, Take it Easy: An Empirical Analysis of Adverse 
Incentives Caused by Revenue Sharing
Daniel A. Rascher
University of San Francisco
Mark S. Nagel and Matthew T. Brown
University of South Carolina
Chad D. McEvoy
Illinois State University
A fundamental belief in professional sport leagues is that competitive balance is needed to maximize demand 
and revenues; therefore, leagues have created policies attempting to attain proper competitive balance. Further, 
research posits that objectives of professional sport teams’ owners include some combination of winning and 
profit maximization. Although the pursuit of wins is a zero sum game, revenue generation and potential profit 
making is not. This article focuses upon the National Football League’s potential unintended consequences 
of creating the incentive for some teams to free ride on the rest of the league’s talent and brand. It examines 
whether an owner’s objectives to generate increased revenues and profits are potentially enhanced by operating 
as a continual low-cost provider while making money from the shared revenues and brand value of the league. 
The present evidence indicates that, overall, being a low-cost provider is more profitable than increasing player 
salaries in an attempt to win additional games.
The ownership of the Cincinnati Bengals has broken 
the unwritten contract between a team and its fans. 
The ownership of this organization has actively pur-
sued a course of action which has materially indebted 
itself to the people of Cincinnati yet has failed to 
deliver a competitive product. . . The ownership of 
this organization is causing a lack of balance in the 
AFC Central and the NFL as a whole. (Mission State-
ment of MikeBrownSucks.com [Cat, n.d., para.1]).
During the 1990s, the Cincinnati Bengals of the 
National Football League (NFL) were the worst team in 
the league, averaging just five wins per season (“Stand-
ings,” 2008). Mike Brown, owner of the Bengals, is 
notorious for his unwillingness to spend money to provide 
fans with a decent on-field product (Daugherty, 2008). 
However, despite their poor on-field record, the Bengals 
were the league’s fifth most profitable team. Further, 
additional teams consistently performing poorly on the 
field in this timeframe, such as the Tampa Bay Buccaneers 
and the Chicago Bears, were also among the NFL’s most 
profitable teams (“NFL team valuations,” 2005). Dallas 
Cowboys owner Jerry Jones noted his displeasure with 
teams who may be underperforming on the field, while 
overachieving (compared with league averages) finan-
cially due to revenue sharing (Helyar, 2006). Achieving 
the “optimal” level of revenue sharing has been a discus-
sion in owners’ meetings as well as in collective bargain-
ing negotiations with the players (Weisman, 2006).
Similar concerns and anecdotal evidence of greater 
profits from inferior team performance exists in other 
major North American sport leagues. Under Donald 
Sterling’s ownership, the Los Angeles Clippers of the 
National Basketball Association (NBA) has consistently 
been one of the worst on-the-court teams in the league, 
yet is reportedly one of the most profitable (Rovell, 2003). 
Before resigning Elton Brand in 2003, the Clippers had 
usually either traded or allowed their best players to 
leave via free agency instead of paying huge salaries to 
retain their services (O’Sullivan, 2002; Rovell). Despite 
more than half of the NBA teams making the playoffs 
each year, the Clippers has only had four playoff appear-
ances since Donald Sterling bought the team in 1981. 
In 2004, Major League Baseball’s (MLB) Tampa Bay 
Rays, though ranking near the bottom of the league 
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in payroll, home attendance, and winning percentage, 
were the second most profitable team behind the Bal-
timore Orioles, generating $27.2 million in operating 
income (Snel, 2005). The Rays’ 2004 profitability was 
largely due to a $20 million subsidy provided by MLB’s 
revenue-sharing program. Further, revenue sharing may 
actually discourage on-field success and hamper profit-
ability. In 2001, 13 of 16 MLB clubs that were required 
to contribute to the revenue-sharing pool lost money at 
the end of the season. The St. Louis Cardinals finished 
tied for first place in the National League Central division 
and had income from baseball operations of $1.9 million. 
Under MLB’s revenue-sharing model, the Cardinals were 
required to pay $8.2 million into the revenue-sharing 
pool. This resulted in a $6.4 million loss after revenue 
sharing (Pappas, 2002).
Articles in the popular press and trade publica-
tions have specifically discussed the recent profitability 
“problems” in professional sports and their possible link 
to league revenue-sharing models (Bloom, 2006; Dosh, 
2007). In MLB, critics have noted that even though reve-
nue-sharing dollars are designed to improve team perfor-
mance, smaller revenue producing franchises have spent 
the money on any set of expenses or even pocketed it as 
profit rather than improved their on-field performance 
(Bloom; Kovacevic, 2005; Snel, 2005; Weir, 2002). For 
some teams, such as the Pittsburgh Pirates or Milwau-
kee Brewers, it appears that revenue sharing is creating 
a disincentive to compete for top players. Those teams 
have received considerable criticism for continuing to 
decrease their player payroll despite receiving increased 
revenue-sharing payments under the Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement (CBA) and generating higher unshared 
revenues from new facilities (Dosh, 2007).
These anecdotal examples suggest that, in North 
American sport leagues, it might be possible to increase 
overall net income by fielding a less expensive, and often 
less talented, team. When one franchise in a chain of 
restaurants, for instance, can maintain or even enhance 
profitability by consistently offering subpar service 
because the other members of the chain support market-
ing activities that enhance the brand value, free riding 
has occurred (Lopatka & Herndon, 1997). In sport, if a 
free-rider could reap larger profits than other teams in 
its league through the decision to decrease operational 
expenses, the overall brand value of the league could 
eventually decrease.
The purpose of this study was to empirically test 
whether free riding exists in the NFL. The NFL was 
chosen for analysis because it shared approximately 70% 
of its overall revenues among its franchises, a greater 
percentage than any other major North American profes-
sional league (Alesia, 2002; Bell, 2004). Just as important 
is the availability of sufficient NFL data, compared with 
other leagues, to test these ideas. Lopatka and Herndon 
(1997) specifically noted the NFL’s revenue-sharing 
model’s potential to encourage minimal owner invest-
ments in player payroll; “indeed, NFL owners have a 
greater interest in preventing free riding than do owners 
of teams in other leagues because of the NFL’s unusu-
ally high level of revenue sharing” (p. 760). There is 
certainly the possibility that other leagues have free-riding 
franchises that lower player quality while generating 
greater profits, but the NFL’s revenue-sharing model and 
sources of shared revenue (primarily its national televi-
sion contracts) spurred this investigation. Contrary to 
previous literature, this article directly tests the impact 
of free riding on team profits and the resulting incentives 
involved. While revenue sharing is not necessary to cause 
free riding, it can serve to enhance the incentives for 
owners to free ride. This article shows that free riding 
does exist in the NFL (utilizing 10 years’ worth of team 
level data), and specifically demonstrates which teams 
are free riding.
Specifically, the article is organized in the following 
sections. First, the literature review examines profes-
sional sports’ league structures as well as the specific 
financial information pertinent to an investigation of the 
NFL. Next, the article presents the scholarly literature 
pertaining to free riding in professional sports, followed 
by a section that develops a theory investigating why free 
riding results from incentives created by the NFL. The 
article then presents and discusses data used to examine 
the theory. Finally, the article provides data analysis, and 
presents conclusions and a discussion of implications 
for the NFL as well as other professional sport leagues.
Review of Literature
Franchises within professional sport leagues operate 
not as independent organizations desiring to completely 
eliminate their fellow competitors, but as a quasi-socialist 
franchisee-franchisor cartel (Scully, 1995). While teams 
compete on the field, they collaborate in other business 
activities to maintain the league’s overall financial viabil-
ity. If league owners did not cooperate, it is likely that 
franchises in smaller cities would not remain financially 
solvent (Fort, 2003; Harris, 1986; Helyar, 2006). Most 
North American professional sport leagues have adopted 
certain activities such as joint marketing campaigns, 
pooled-debt instruments, and revenue sharing as methods 
to prevent smaller market teams from being unable to 
compete with clubs in larger markets (Fort).
Although all franchisee-franchisor companies retain 
elements of cooperation and minimum standards of 
performance, professional sport leagues are “peculiar” 
in that performance (defined by fans as wins) is a zero-
sum game even though profitability for each franchise 
is not (Fort, 2003). While consistently negative service 
quality for one franchise in a McDonald’s chain will not 
negatively affect every store nationwide, in North Ameri-
can professional sports, a team which perpetually loses 
can negatively impact the overall financial performance 
of every other franchise—specifically by decreasing 
overall industry demand (Fort). In addition, where the 
inadequately performing McDonald’s license can be 
revoked, in professional sports, contraction of poorly 
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performing franchises can be met with financial as well 
as legal difficulties (“MLB at a crossroads…,” 2002).
In North American sport leagues, teams equally share 
revenue from national broadcast rights, Internet advertis-
ing, licensed merchandise, and other sources (Brown, 
Nagel, McEvoy, & Rascher, 2004). Franchises are per-
mitted to keep local revenue which is typically associ-
ated with local broadcast contracts and facility revenues 
such as luxury suites, parking, and concessions (Foster, 
Greyser, & Walsh, 2006). The NFL shares a greater 
share of its revenues than any other North American 
league. In particular, where most leagues permit teams 
to retain general ticketing monies, the NFL takes 40% of 
all ticketing revenue and divides it equally among every 
club (Brown et al., 2004). In addition, since the NFL has 
no “locally” broadcast regular or postseason games, all 
television revenues—which averaged $2.8 billion a year 
in 2005 and which increased to over $4 billion a year 
in 2006—are shared equally (Maske, 2005). The NFL 
generates considerably more money from its television 
contracts than any other source (Foster et al., 2006).
With such a large portion of shared revenues, many 
NFL teams have focused their efforts toward developing 
local revenues that they can retain for themselves rather 
than share with other franchises (Brown et al., 2004). In 
most cases, the most effective way to increase unshared 
revenue is to improve the teams’ facility—specifically 
the unshared revenues that are created through enhanced 
luxury suite and premium seat sales. This has resulted 
in teams searching for significantly remodeled or new 
facilities, often financed by municipalities. Even under 
the latest collective bargaining agreement (“National 
Football League…,” 2006), where poorer revenue-
generating teams are provided a supplement from the 
top 15 franchises earning the most from nontelevision 
and ticketing income, facility revenues remain important. 
The $100 million total amount of this new supplement in 
2006 was approximately equal to the disparity between 
the highest and lowest team revenues in the league that 
year (Bell, 2006).
In some cases, the lure of the new stadium and its 
unshared revenue sources has resulted in NFL teams 
moving from larger markets to smaller ones based upon 
a “sweetheart” lease arrangement (1995—Los Angeles 
Rams to St. Louis; 1995—Los Angeles Raiders to Oak-
land; 1997—Houston Oilers to Nashville [Tennessee] 
Titans; Barrett, 2003; Donatelli, 2003). However, by 
choosing to maximize unshared revenues in a smaller 
metropolitan area, these teams potentially may hurt a 
shared-revenue source such as the national television 
contract. In addition, other league-wide revenue sources 
may not be as lucrative without a team’s presence in one 
of the largest metropolitan communities (Martzke, 2005).
Though there may be attractive options, NFL 
teams do not have to move to a new metropolitan area 
to potentially increase revenues and possibly free ride. 
Throughout the 1990s and into the early 21st century the 
Cincinnati Bengals were consistently one of the most 
profitable teams because of high revenues from the NFL’s 
national television agreement as well as attendance by 
diehard fans who continued to purchase tickets despite 
the team’s subpar on-field performance (Daugherty, 
2008). The Bengals also enhanced their profitability by 
not only fielding an inferior on-field product but also by 
limiting management expenses. For instance, in 2002 the 
Bengals had 68 employees (not including players) while 
the Buffalo Bills had 142 employees (Monk, 2002). The 
Bengals small scouting staff of five (two of whom were 
family members), paled in comparison with the 15 profes-
sional scouts who were employed by the Bills. Moreover, 
the owner, Mike Brown, doubles as the team’s General 
Manager. Clearly, the ownership presents the appearance 
that it is not interested in spending money to create a 
winning team (Daugherty). The Bengals’ frugality was 
believed to be one of the main reasons the NFL Players 
Association demanded a salary floor when the initial 
NFL salary cap was implemented in 1993 (“Questions 
and answers…,” 2006). In addition, the limited staff and 
the team’s poor performance caused some fans to launch 
a negative website titled www.mikebrownsucks.com to 
voice their displeasure. In general (see Table 1), about 
28% of a team’s expenses are not subject to the player 
salary floor minimum. In other words, these expenses 
(team expenses plus General and Administrative [G&A] 
expenses) divided by player costs plus team expenses plus 
G&A expenses are available for the owner to minimize.
The NFL’s extensive revenue-sharing system permits 
the Bengals, or any other team, to keep only a portion of 
the revenue that an additional dollar spent on marketing 
generates. Ross (2000) previously noted that even though 
revenue sharing creates some desirable outcomes, it may 
also decrease the incentives for teams to promote in-
person attendance or merchandise sales. Free riding under 
an extensive revenue-sharing system may also result in 
diminished player costs, as the incremental financial 
effect of improving the team by signing a “star” player 
is shared with the rest of the league. A revenue-sharing 
system assumes that each team will maximize its fiscal 
endeavors to procure the best players and field its best 
possible team. However, the background and motivation 
of each owner is different. For some, the team may have 
been in the family for multiple generations with the team 
serving as the primary source of income (Harris, 1986). 
Other owners have achieved financial success in various 
industries and their foray into professional sports is pri-
marily driven by glory derived from winning rather than 
the financial bottom line (Wertheim, 2007). Even within 
the “new breed” of sport owners, the timing of their 
purchase into the league may impact their debt service 
and, therefore, their need to generate immediate financial 
returns. In addition, for some owners, the desired profit 
margin and/or desire to win may be augmented by public 
relations considerations (e.g., getting the owner’s name 
in the newspaper, on television). Given the tremendous 
difference in owner motivation and financial backing, it 
may be difficult to precisely determine if teams are free 
riding or simply implementing predetermined spending 
levels which will meet financial expectations. Regardless 
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of the owner’s motivation, the NFL Players Association 
(NFLPA) has a vested interest in determining if free riding 
occurs as free riding may artificially decrease player 
compensation as players receive 59.5% of total league 
revenues under the current CBA (“National Football 
League …,” 2006).
NFL owners have speculated that some owners are 
gaining higher profits from their revenue sharing by pock-
eting money that was designed to be spent on improving 
overall on-field quality (Helyar, 2006). A few large market 
teams have even expressed frustration that revenue shar-
ing has resulted in smaller market teams consistently 
producing greater profits than the higher revenue clubs 
that generated the revenue to be shared (Helyar).1 This 
certainly was a consideration for the NFL owners’ delib-
erations regarding the most recent CBA and is likely to be 
an important component of the next CBA (“Jerry Jones 
fined…,” 2009). Determining whether individual teams 
are truly free riding is difficult given different team’s 
analysis of individual player quality and each team’s 
desire to implement a specific team-building strategy 
(e.g., acquire free agents, draft players, trade players). 
However, identifying free riding across the league could 
lead to changes in the overall revenue-sharing allocation 
as the league would desire to have a plan that optimizes 
revenue sharing without compromising team incentives.
There have been several studies regarding free riding 
and its effects upon a variety of sport-league operations. 
For instance, Késenne (2000) demonstrated the condi-
tions that allow for revenue sharing to improve competi-
tive balance, decrease competitive balance, or have no 
effect on competitive balance. His model noted that if 
the marginal impact of the visiting team on revenues is 
minimal or similar across teams, then revenue sharing will 
worsen competitive balance as home teams will have no 
incentive to improve their quality as their increased rev-
enues will be immediately distributed across the league.
Other authors used models to investigate revenue-
sharing issues specifically tied to attendance by custom-
ers who are purchasing because of the presence of the 
visiting team (Fort & Quirk, 1995; Marburger, 1997; 
Rascher, 1997; Vrooman, 1996). These authors found that 
increases in revenue sharing will either improve competi-
tive balance in a league or have minimal-to-no-impact on 
competitive balance. Fort and Quirk noted that additional 
theoretical and empirical research regarding competitive 
balance needs to be conducted.
Szymanski and Késenne (2004) demonstrated that 
revenue sharing makes competitive balance worse. The 
authors examined gate revenues and the impact of revenue 
sharing not only on competitive balance but also on the 
potential total investment in player talent. Their findings 
Table 1 Summary Statistics
Variable Minimum Mean Maximum Std. Deviation
Population of 
MSA or CMSA
191,638 5,034,051 10,571,507 5,089,43
CMSA equals 1, 
MSA equals 0
0 0.5 1 0.49
Annual Wins 1 7.9 1 2.95
Annual  
Attendance
123,761 481,127 635,889 80,542
Year Stadium 
Opened
192 196 199 16.2
Stadium  
Capacity
56,692 69,785 92,516 7,740
Number of 
Major Profes-
sional Sports 
Teams
1. 3. 8. 1.
Local Revenues $12,61 $28,61 $83.92 $12,41
Operating  
Revenues
$28,14 $70,01 $189,49 $24,69
Player Costs $14,70 $41,18 $76,82 $14,19
Operating  
Profits
-$13,602 $6,93 $36,50 $7,80
Team Expenses $3,91 $8,57 $19,11 $2,82
General and 
Administrative 
Expenses
$2,02 $7,27 $29,46 $4,18
Note. All financial information is in $1,000s.
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contrasted with earlier research related to gate revenue 
sharing and competitive balance in a league. Similarly, 
Palomino and Rigotti (2000) showed that revenue sharing 
lowered the incentive for a team to put forth the effort (in 
terms of spending money to improve team quality) to win. 
The authors stated, “… competing hard to win is waste-
ful” (p. 15). Palomino and Rigotti further noted that the 
optimal level of revenue sharing is difficult to ascertain.
Although free riding incentives exist in any franchi-
see-franchisor relationship, the literature demonstrates 
that revenue sharing in sport leagues can enhance the 
effects and thus the incentive to free ride. Mason (1997) 
described the principal-agent problem inherent in the 
NFL’s structure, noting that interests are aligned quite 
well because of revenue sharing; however, there are 
still situations where owners’ interests diverge. Mason 
believed the NFL could not effectively merge into a 
single entity because of the need for contest legitimacy 
(fan perception that decisions are made by one owner to 
defeat another owner). Ultimately, sport leagues such as 
the NFL desire a competitive league with enough revenue 
sharing to enable every franchise to maintain competitive 
balance. However, the movement of teams to smaller 
markets for unshared revenues—which may decrease 
overall shared revenues—combined with the potential 
desire of teams with or without new facilities to present 
a consistently inferior (underpaid) on-field product could 
create a system where revenue sharing is not the optional 
mechanism to maximize overall league financial success.
Theory
The structure of sport leagues, the NFL in particular, 
is complex from the perspective of incentives and gov-
ernance. Most businesses have a single principal-agent 
relationship where the owner (principal) hires employees 
(agents) to carry out the owner’s objectives. The NFL has 
a dual-layered principal-agent structure, but it is made 
even more complex by the fact that the principal at the top 
(the league itself) has, as its ultimate principal, the team 
owners. The Commissioner retains considerable power in 
the NFL, but still serves at the discretion of the league’s 
owners. In this structure, the league is a principal trying 
to maximize the net value of the owners’ franchises as a 
whole, subject to some minimal variation across teams. 
Each owner is effectively an agent serving the league’s 
objectives. At the franchise level, each owner serves as 
the principal and hires employees to be the agents to carry 
out his or her objectives. There is not a true principal 
at the league level, but instead the group of owners act 
as their own principal. To make a major change in the 
league, the NFL requires three-quarters of team owners 
to agree upon the change. As Mason (1997) suggested, 
an individual owner may find it in their own interest to 
relocate to a new city or (as this article analyzes) to offer 
a low quality, inexpensive product.
Given that there are 32 owners in the NFL with 
different market sizes, stadiums, lease arrangements, 
fan bases, and objectives, it is not surprising that some 
owners would be more interested in profit maximization 
while others might want to pursue on-field victories and 
Super Bowl championships. Added to this structure and 
owner variability is substantial revenue sharing across 
teams. The amount of revenue sharing is an endogenous 
factor decided upon by the league itself. To the extent that 
winning and profitability are aligned, there should not 
be a principal-agent problem of diverging interests (see 
Vrooman, 1996). However, winning and profit maximiza-
tion are not always aligned (Gerrard, 2005).
This article examined one principal-agent issue, 
whether spending less money operating a franchise (and 
being a low-cost provider of the product) is more profit-
able. Profitability is partially based on the brand value and 
revenue capabilities of the broader league as well as the 
performance of the individual franchise. A single team 
can spend less money, offer a low quality product, but still 
draw fans and share in the national TV contract revenues, 
all while lowering the overall brand of the league (as 
Jerry Jones contends). This article does not discuss the 
effort of agents (franchise employees) in carrying out a 
team owner’s objectives. An NFL franchise can release 
a football player who is not performing or fire a front 
office employee who is not providing adequate results. 
Thus, free riding in this context is not about effort, but 
about the active decision to spend less money and earn 
profits based on the brand of the league as a whole and 
the quality of the other teams in the league.
Given the structure described above, let π be the 
objective function of the NFL. The league’s objectives 
are fluid based on the possibly changing objectives of 
individual owners. However, the requirement that three-
quarters of owners must agree to a change tempers the 
whims of individual owners, yet makes some optimiza-
tion second best. Let the league maximize
 = ∏ −∑∏ ( ( ), var( ( )))   i i  (1)
where πi is the profit of the ith team. Thus, the league 
tries to maximize the sum of the profits across the teams 
(total league profitability), but also tries to minimize the 
variation in profitability across the league. The league 
chooses α (the percentage of local revenues that the 
franchise gets to keep) to allow for there to be enough 
revenue sharing to keep the league intact and prevent any 
failing franchises. The “–var” shows that the league wants 
to make the variance of profitability minimal (which is 
equivalent to maximizing the negative variance). This is a 
general formulation of the league’s objective function and 
does not specify a model or how much weight is placed on 
total profitability and the minimization of the variance in 
profitability. Given that the league is comprised of owners 
and can only make significant changes with an affirma-
tive vote by three-quarters of the owners, the objective 
function for the league is actually quite complicated, and 
this is just one method of formulating it.
As an example, in 2001, MLB announced it was 
considering the contraction of two of its franchises. The 
entire league was not experiencing problems, but some 
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individual franchises were believed to be experiencing 
financial difficulty. The contraction option was eventually 
tabled due to concerns by the MLB Players Association 
and other entities but the incident displayed how MLB’s 
structure that limited revenue sharing had a negative 
impact upon some franchises. Therefore, the NFL has 
multiple objectives including maximizing total league 
profitability (or league valuation), but also upholding 
financially struggling franchises.
As described earlier, there are two levels of princi-
pals making decisions in the NFL, the league level and 
the franchise level (or each team owner). Equation (1) 
describes the league’s decision objectives. At the fran-
chise level, an owner maximizes his or her objectives 
which are a combination of profits and winning (Gerrard, 
2005; Rascher, 1997). Thus, the owner maximizes
 V Wi i i i i= + −  ( )1  (2)
Vi is the value to the owner and is a function of that 
owner’s profits (πi) and winning (Wi). The parameter δi 
is bounded by 0 and 1 and it represents the importance of 
those two attributes to owner i’s objectives. Winning and 
profits are in different units, but without loss of generality, 
they will both be interpreted as being in monetary units 
(i.e., one could create a transformation accounting for the 
amount of winning that equals a certain amount of profit).
The profit function for an NFL franchise shows that 
the incremental gain from winning more games (which 
is tied to spending more money in this model) is either 
positive, negative, or zero and is thus an empirical issue. 
Let πi be team i’s profit, such that
   i i i i i j jN L W C W L W= + − + −( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1  (3)
where Wi equals annual franchise wins for team i, N 
equals national revenues that the franchise receives 
(and is not based on its own number of wins), (LiWi) is 
local franchise revenues for team i (and is based on the 
number of wins for the team), α is the percentage of local 
revenues that the franchise gets to keep, and Ci(Wi)  is 
franchise expenses (which are based on team wins under 
the assumption that winning more games costs more 
money). Moreover, Lj(Wj) are revenues received from the 
opposing team when team i travels to team j’s stadium 
to play. In summary, team i profits from the national TV 
contract (largely independent of team i’s performance), 
the share of its local revenues that it gets to keep, the share 
of the opposing teams’ local revenues (here designated as 
the single team j), and team i pays a cost to field a team.
Revenue sharing rules during the 1990s in the NFL 
put α at approximately 0.60, implying that for each dollar 
created at the local level, the team shared 40 cents with 
the league or opposing team directly (Rascher, 1997). As 
in Gerrard (2005), let
 C C Q Wi i i= + +0    (4)
where C0 represents the fixed costs of running the 
franchise and γ is the incremental or marginal cost of 
purchasing talent (Qi). In other words, γ captures the 
additional expenditures a franchise needs to spend to 
purchase more talent (i.e., player salaries). There is also 
an incremental cost to winning (λ), such as bonuses for 
winning and advancing into the playoffs, etc. Equation 
(5) is W W Qi i= ( ). Thus, winning will depend on team 
quality.
Similarly, let
 L L Wi i= +0   (6)
with L0 representing local revenues that are not tied 
directly to winning, and β capturing the marginal revenue 
from winning a game.
An interesting aspect of the NFL (and other sport 
leagues) is that diverging interests between the league and 
each franchise (or diverging interests across owners as it 
were) can occur at the high and low ends of expenditures. 
A free-riding owner would spend as little as possible in 
fielding a team and maximize profits by saving on costs 
and sharing in the revenues from the opposing teams. This 
owner would place a low valuation on Wi in his or her 
objective function. This can harm other owners because 
they will receive less revenue through revenue sharing 
(and the brand may begin to be harmed).
Alternatively, a high spending owner (who may be 
relatively more interested in winning than other owners) 
maximizes his or her objectives by fielding a winning 
team. However, this can also diverge from the interests 
of the league and other owners because in spending more 
money, it can raise the cost of talent by increasing player 
salaries. This is similar to raising rivals’ costs as discussed 
in the industrial organization literature.
An owner maximizes his or her objective by choos-
ing the quantity of talent (Qi) for the team given the fixed 
parameters α, β , γ , and λ. The first order conditions are 
below. It is solved by taking the derivative of Vi with 
respect to Qi (labeled Vi) in Equation (2) and setting it 
equal to zero to ensure that the maximum V has been 
achieved. Let
 V W W Wi i i i i i
' ' ' '( )= − − + − =    1 0  (7)
Rearranging it as in (7’) below, one can see that the left-
hand side is the marginal benefit of hiring an incremental 
unit of talent. That is, one more unit if talent causes 
winning to rise according to Equation (5), multiplied by 
the amount that the owner cares about profits (δi), the 
percentage of local revenues kept (α), and the impact 
of winning on revenues (β). That is the effect on the 
profit portion of the value function. An incremental unit 
of talent also improves winning (again as in Equation 
(5), and winning itself is valued by the owner according 
to(1− δi). Equation (5) is assumed to be upward sloping, 
but with diminishing returns (a standard assumption).
     i i i i iW W W
' ' '( )+ − = +1  (7’)
The right-hand side of Equation (7’) shows the marginal 
cost of purchasing one more unit of talent. The direct cost 
(γ) is added to the cost that is based on winning (e.g., per-
formance bonuses or payments for making the playoffs).
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Before conducting the static analysis, it is useful 
to consider some special cases for comparison. First, if 
owner i was a profit maximizer who did not care about 
winning, then δi would be 1 and Equation (7’) would 
reduce to   W Wi i
' '
= +  (7”). Further, if the conven-
tion in Fort and Quirk (1995) is followed, where talent 
is defined such that one incremental unit of talent equals 
one additional win (violating the nonlinearity assump-
tion above), then we have   = +  (Equation (7’’’). 
Finally, if we assume that there are no bonus payments 
for winning, then  =  (Equation (7’’’’). The empiri-
cal section will test this final equation along with direct 
tests of expenditures on profitability. The more general 
equations cannot be examined with the empirical data 
because there is no way to distinguish between the talent 
level of each team and its number of wins with the data 
set being used.
For a sport-focused owner (one who strongly desires 
to win), the marginal cost of purchasing more talent rises 
as more talent is purchased. Thus, total player payroll 
and payroll per unit of talent is higher for sport-focused 
owners. The implication is that there is a tradeoff between 
maximizing profits and winning, so a free-riding owner 
(whose primary concern is not winning, but making 
profits) will hire less talent than a sport-focused owner 
or one who cares about both winning and profits. This 
is important because the optimal actions taken will vary 
across owner type. If it were such that winning as much 
as possible coincided with profit maximizing, then there 
would not be a free riding problem because all owners 
would try to win (and thus maximize profits) as much as 
possible. This proposition can be seen by noting that as 
δi decreases (meaning the owner cares more about win-
ning), the LHS of Equation (7’) rises (because αβ≤1), 
causing the RHS to rise (which is an increase in marginal 
cost caused by increasing the level of talent). Therefore, 
being a sport-focused owner is consistent with making 
less than maximum profits.
A second proposition is that sportsman owners, in 
their quest to win more games, cause the incremental cost 
of hiring playing talent to rise for all team owners (not just 
themselves). This follows from the same analysis above 
for the sport-focused owner, only that the marginal cost 
of hiring talent is faced by all team owners.
The league chooses the level of revenue sharing 
according to its optimization problem (Equation (1)). 
Higher levels of revenue sharing (lower α) correspond to 
a decrease in the marginal benefit from winning (LHS of 
Equation (7’)), so owners purchase less talent, lowering 
Wi (which keeps the LHS equal to the RHS). Further, for 
profit-maximizing owners, this is even more pronounced. 
Comparing Equations (7’) and (7”), a fixed decrease in 
α lowers the LHS of Equation (7”) more than Equation 
(7’). Profit-maximizers react more strongly to increased 
revenue sharing by lowering their talent purchases than do 
sport-focused owners. In fact, in the extreme if all owners 
were win maximizers, then α drops out of Equation (7’) 
and revenue sharing has no impact on the decisions of 
the owners. They all try to buy more talent, bidding up 
its price.
Sport-focused owners’ decisions increase the costs 
for profit maximizing owners, but is the opposite true? 
Do profit maximizers who free ride harm sport-focused 
owners’ profits? This is a cross effect of the change in 
profits for team i from a decrease in talent purchased by 
team j. Using Equations (3), (5), and (6), the derivative 
of πi with respect to Qj is ( ) '1− Wj , which is positive. 
Therefore, a decrease in playing talent by team j (the 
free rider), lowers the profits of team i. In addition, it 
is exacerbated by increased revenue sharing (lower α).
In summary, the key theoretical findings are (a) that 
there is a trade-off between sport-focused owners want-
ing to win and maximize profits, (b) free riding by one 
owner will harm the profits of sport-focused owners, (c) 
higher revenue sharing will cause owners to want to free 
ride even more than they normally would, (d) if teams 
are profit-maximizing, then the sensitivity of winning on 
revenues (β) will be equal to the sensitivity of winning on 
costs (γ and λ), and (e) if the NFL is structured to create 
incentives to free ride or keep costs down, then lowered 
expenses (from player talent acquisition) will raise 
profits because the revenue effect will be outweighed by 
the expense effect (from winning). Substantial revenue 
sharing and the existence of different owner types across 
the spectrum of profits and winning causes some owners 
(those who care more about profits than winning) to free 
ride on the league’s brand and talent in the NFL. Two 
testable hypotheses are summarized in (d) and (e) above.
Methods
Subjects
Annual NFL team financial data were gathered for the 
years 1989–1999 to determine whether free riding exists 
in the NFL. Data were collected from the conforming 
financial statements sent by each team to the Commis-
sioner’s office and released during The Oakland Raiders 
v. National Football League (2001) case. Team-specific 
financial data included local revenues, operating rev-
enues, player payroll, team expenses, G&A expenses, 
and operating profit. Of the 319 available observations, 
309 (97%) were useable. More recent data from the 
NFL are not publicly available. There were some critics 
of the accuracy of the financial data (Zimbalist, 2001); 
however, this information was sent from each franchise 
to the Commissioner and the NFL Board of Governors 
(made up of some of the team owners) and was used to 
set NFL policy. As well, its accuracy was not disputed 
during the trial.
Variables
Two categories of profits and four categories of expenses 
were developed. The categories were:
Operating profits—profit reported in the league 
documents
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Calculated profits—operating revenue minus sum-
mary expenses
Player costs—player payroll reported in the league 
documents
General and administrative expenses—G&A 
expenses reported in the league documents
Team expenses—direct team-related expenses such 
as salaries and other costs associated with coaching, 
scouting, and training
Summary expenses—the sum of player payroll, 
G&A expenses, and team expenses.
To compare data reported over the time frame, a second 
set of financial variables was created by transforming the 
financial data into 1998 dollars. Comparisons could then 
be made across years and across teams, not just across 
teams for a given year.
The annual number of wins, home game total 
attendance (including preseason games), the age of the 
stadium, stadium capacity for football, the number of 
major professional sport teams (MLB, NBA, National 
Hockey League (NHL), and NFL) in the local area, and 
the local MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area) or CMSA 
(Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area) population 
were used as control factors in the analysis. These data 
were collected from sportsline.com, ballparks.com, the 
U.S. Census Bureau, and individual team websites. The 
population entry was created by interpolating data from 
the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses. Table 1 outlines the 
summary statistics for these data, and Table 2 provides 
correlations.
Procedures
The data were graphically analyzed across the various 
combinations of profits, revenues, and expenses. Given 
that there are two forms of profit (operating and calcu-
lated) and four types of expenses (player, general and 
administrative, team, and summary), eight plots repre-
senting all combinations of the data were created. To 
account for control factors that may skew the graphical 
results, locally-weighted least squares (LOWESS) regres-
sions were completed. LOWESS regressions essentially 
run a separate linear regression for each data point using 
some of the other data points right around it. It then plots 
a line from that regression, slides over, and does it again 
with the next data point, until all of the data points have 
been analyzed. Given that it is a nonparametric method, 
there are no coefficient estimates produced, but instead a 
graphical representation of the regression curve is created. 
The size of the group used for each data point and how 
Table 2 Correlation Matrix
Number Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Population of 
MSA or CMSA
1.00
2 CMSA equals 1, 
MSA equals 0
0.54 1.00
3 Annual Wins -0.05 -0.03 1.00
4 Annual Atten-
dance
0.13 0.13 0.42 1.00
5 Year Stadium 
Opened
-0.15 -0.29 0.01 0.08 1.00
6 Stadium Capac-
ity
0.30 0.00 0.09 0.45 -0.16 1.00
7 Number of 
Major Profes-
sional Sports 
Teams
0.91 0.57 -0.06 0.17 -0.15 0.30 1.00
8 Local Revenues -0.01 0.03 0.20 0.36 0.30 0.04 0.00 1.00
9 Operating Rev-
enues
-0.02 -0.01 0.12 0.25 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.87 1.00
10 Player Costs -0.01 -0.04 0.09 0.17 0.19 0.04 0.00 0.70 0.91 1.00
11 Operating Profits -0.10 -0.07 0.12 0.22 0.27 -0.08 -0.06 0.65 0.58 0.28 1.00
12 Team Expenses 0.18 0.12 0.02 0.25 0.08 0.24 0.12 0.48 0.60 0.62 0.00 1.00
13 General and 
Administrative 
Expenses
-0.08 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.12 -0.12 -0.03 0.71 0.68 0.52 0.33 0.43 1.00
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much weight is placed on the closer versus further points 
within that group is chosen by the user. This analysis used 
bandwidths between 0.4 and 0.8, meaning that 40–80% 
of the data are used, centered on the specific data point 
that is being estimated. In addition, the weighting mecha-
nism chosen is the standard one developed by Cleveland 
(1979), who first introduced LOWESS. It is called the 
tricube weight function and gives no weight to points 
that are a given distance from the data point in question.
The result of LOWESS is a nonlinear regression line 
that shows small variations in the data. Because LOWESS 
uses standard regression techniques over small subsets 
of the data, it is good at handling outliers by minimizing 
their effects on the final LOWESS regression line.
It is possible that there is a variable that is correlated 
with both profit and expenses, such as market size, that 
is missing from the graphical analysis (i.e., a specifica-
tion problem). To investigate this, a series of regressions, 
both linear and polynomial, were completed as well. 
Generally, only reduced form models with statistically 
significant variables were reported (not the full models 
with insignificant variables).
Separately, the parameters β and γ were analyzed 
from Equations (4) and (6) by regressing summary 
expenses on team wins to get γ, and regressing local 
revenues on team wins to get β. The reasons for conduct-
ing numerous analyses around the same question is that 
nonlinear regressions (LOWESS) allow one to see any 
specific curves or kinks in the data that linear regression 
smoothes over. However, the nonlinear regressions are 
not interpretable in terms of incremental impacts (i.e., 
they do not produce coefficients). Besides understand-
ing what the parameters are, this is the first analysis that 
directly compares profitability in professional sports to 
expenditures.
Hypotheses
It is important to note that compared with the NBA 
and NHL, the NFL has exhibited lower fitting models 
of financial variables. Miller (2009) created empirical 
models of franchise value for the NBA, NHL, and NFL. 
His goodness-of-fit for the NBA and NHL models were 
around 0.68 and 0.50 respectively. However, for the NFL 
models, it was less than 0.28. One of his reasons given 
is that there is extensive revenue sharing (driven by the 
national TV contract) that flattens out revenues across 
teams regardless of the underlying fundamental differ-
ences across winning and population. Similarly, Alex-
ander and Kern (2004) found a positive and significant 
relationship between franchise values and population for 
the NBA and NHL, but not for the NFL. Low goodness-
of-fit for the profit regressions of NFL franchises is not 
surprising given the previous finding related to the NFL 
and related to estimating profit functions as opposed to 
revenue functions.
This notion is related to one of the points of this 
article, that the NFL purposefully shares revenues regard-
less of the nature of each team’s market or winning 
prospects to minimize the risk for franchise owners. The 
league realizes that each owner is in business together 
(not competitors) in many ways and it is in the interests 
of the league as a whole to minimize the financial risk. 
Statistically, this causes the dependent variable to have 
low variance, thus there is not much variation for the 
explanatory variables to explain.
As discussed in the theoretical section, it is expected 
that β ≥ γ because the financial gain from winning ought 
to be at least as high as the financial cost (under the 
assumption that λ = 0, or that the playoff payments to 
players is de minimis). In addition, it is expected that αβ 
− γ will be near zero relative to the size of α and β (based 
on profit maximization) or negative to keep league costs 
down. This will also be investigated directly by consider-
ing the relationship between expenses and profits (is that 
relationship negative, as expected to minimize league-
wide costs or is that relationship positive?).
Analysis and Results
Free riding in a sport league occurs when a team is able 
to generate increased profits by offering a lower quality 
on-field product. An NFL owner is potentially able to free 
ride because of the NFL’s brand value and its substantial 
revenue-sharing policy. Figures 1a—1h contain scatter 
plots of the two profit measures versus the four expense 
categories using the inflation-adjusted variables. They 
also contain a linear fitted line from a linear regression 
along with 95% confidence intervals.
As can be seen in the figures, franchises with lower 
player payrolls, lower team expenses, or lower summary 
expenses typically have higher profits. There does not 
appear to be a relationship between G&A expenses and 
profits. This is not surprising given that the variance 
among teams for G&A expenses is minimal.
Figures 2a—2h contain LOWESS graphs of the 
inflation-adjusted profit versus expenses. Since LOWESS 
is a nonparametric analysis, instead of an equation, graphs 
of the fitted relationship are created. The relationships 
are relatively linear indicating that a linear regression 
is a reasonable approximation of the true relationship 
between the variables. However, the graph of adjusted 
operating profits versus adjusted summary expenses is 
U-shaped. The U-shape indicates that profit can be made 
by either free riding via lower expenses or by spending 
enough money to improve winning and attendance so that 
revenues are increased at a greater rate than costs. This 
is accounted for in the corresponding linear regressions 
in Tables 3 and 4.
As a variable could be correlated with profits and 
expenses, a series of regressions, both linear and poly-
nomial, were completed. The two inflation-adjusted cal-
culated profits models in Table 3 demonstrate that player 
payroll and summary expenses are negatively related to 
profit at the .01 level of statistical significance. The results 
are economically as well as statistically significant. A 
$1 million increase in player payroll is associated with 
382
Figure 1a—1h — Graphs of inflation-adjusted profits and expenses.
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Figure 2a—2h — LOWESS graphs of inflation-adjusted profits and expenses.
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Table 3 Adjusted Calculated Profits and Adjusted Operating Profits (in 1998 Dollars)
Model
Adjusted Calculated 
Profits with Player 
Costs
Adjusted Calculated 
Profits with 
Summary Expenses
Adjusted Operating 
Profits with Player 
Costs
Adjusted Operating 
Profits with 
Summary Expenses
F-statistic 14.84**** 12.42**** 28.16**** 11.88****
R-squared 0.21 0.17 0.25 0.25
Number of Observations 309 309 309 309
Ramsey RESET test F = 0.77 F = 0.82 F = 1.75 F = 1.42
Cook-Weisberg test X2 = 0.10 X2 = 0.81 X2 = 1.30 X2 = 1.35
Variance Inflation Factor test Mean VIF = 1.08 Mean VIF = 1.11 Mean VIF = 1.08 Mean VIF = 1.11
Dependent Variable Adj. Calc. Profits Adj. Calc. Profits Adj. Op Profits Adj. Op. Profits
Independent Variables:
Constant -236,978*** -270,217*** -62,597 -127,916
Player Costs Adjusted for 
Inflation
-0.82**** -1.84****
Summary Expenses Adjusted 
for Inflation
-0.46**** -1.13****
Summary Expenses Adjusted 
for Inflation Squared
.0000199***
CMSA or MSA 2,690* 3,612*** 763 3,225
Year Stadium Opened 154.6*** 166.2*** 94 119*
Significance: *—10% level; **—5% level; ***—1% level; ****—0.1% level.
an $820,000 decrease in calculated profit. This is not 
surprising since nearly 70% of all revenues are shared in 
the NFL, but no player costs are shared. Thus, purchasing 
a talented player for $1 million might generate over $1 
million in revenue. However, most of that will be shared 
with the league, making net franchise profits decrease.
An increase in summary expenses by $1 million 
is associated with a $460,000 decrease in adjusted cal-
culated profits (see Table 3). In the regressions, annual 
number of wins and annual attendance were not included 
since they are intermediate outcomes stemming from 
player costs or summary expenses. Player costs and 
summary expenses were both positively correlated with 
wins and attendance. Population and the number of major 
professional sport teams were not statistically significant. 
Instrumental variables regression and linear regression 
with interaction terms were investigated with the results 
being similar to those reported here. The Ramsey RESET 
test for omitted variable bias was negative. The Cook-
Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity was also negative. 
Variance-inflation factors were low, showing no multi-
collinearity issues in Table 3 except for the polynomial 
(last column).
However, the CMSA dummy variable was significant 
and positive in the full regressions. Finally, as a stadium 
gets older, adjusted calculated profits decrease by about 
$160,000 per year. As expected and mentioned above, the 
R-square only explains about 20% of the variation in prof-
its. The goodness-of-fit for the adjusted operating profits 
regressions (columns 3 and 4) is higher with R-square of 
0.25. An interesting finding is that the regression exam-
ining operating expenses (last column) is U-shaped (as 
suggested by the corresponding LOWESS regression). It 
has a minimum at about $115,000 (which is on the higher 
end of adjusted summary expenses across the teams).
Table 4 depicts the analysis of the variables which 
were not adjusted for inflation. Multicollinearity was 
significant in Table 4. This is not surprising given the 
many variables increasing over time (simply because of 
inflation) that would be correlated together in Table 4. 
Table 3 accounted for that by using inflation-adjusted 
variables. The findings in Table 4 were somewhat similar 
to those in Table 3, but it appears that multicollinearity 
issues caused the coefficients to be different than those 
in Table 3 (because multicollinearity causes t-statistics 
to be artificially high, making it appear that a variable 
is significant, when it might not be). As a result, the 
coefficients, while technically unbiased, have a very 
broad confidence interval. Yearly indicator variables 
were used to account for the annual growth in overall 
franchise expenses in the NFL, with each being statisti-
cally significant (p. < .001), with 1989 as the comparison 
year. The variables of interest, player costs and summary 
expenses, both had negative impacts on operating profits 
and calculated profits and were statistically significant (p. 
<.01). The full models were all statistically significant 
and had R-squares ranging from 0.36 to 0.44. The results 
in Table 3 statistically have a stronger fit, but Table 4 is 
included to show how the raw data (i.e., not adjusted for 
inflation) performed.
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There was a clear negative relationship between 
profit and summary expenses (Table 4). Stadium charac-
teristics and a measure of market size appeared to affect 
profitability, but the impact of expenses on profits was 
greater. An analysis of interaction terms and an analy-
sis of polynomials of the different expense categories 
revealed no significant findings, except for a quadratic 
on Summary Expenses for the Operating Profits model in 
Table 4. Solving for the minimum point on the quadratic 
leads to a minimum Operating Profits where Summary 
Expenses equals about $93 million. This is consistent 
with the Figure 2c.
An examination of linear regressions and LOWESS 
by year showed similar results. In 100% of the 44 
annual linear regressions containing operating profits 
or calculated profits versus player payroll or summary 
expenses and control factors, the coefficient on the 
expense category was negative, with 57% being statisti-
cally significant. In all 11 of the LOWESS regressions of 
annual operating profit versus player payroll, the slope 
of the nonparametric relationship was negative. In six of 
the analyses of annual operating profit versus summary 
expenses, the relationship was negative, while in the 
remaining five analyses, it was U-shaped. Similar results 
were obtained using calculated profits.
An analysis of the parameters β and γ is shown in 
Table 5. The simple univariate regressions (with constant 
terms) yielded significant results for both the model and 
the independent variables. However, the models for rev-
enues and expenses have low R-squared goodness-of-fit 
parameters. This is partially because these are single 
variable models without other explanatory variables. The 
dependent variables were expressed in thousands of dol-
lars; therefore, interpretation of the coefficients needs to 
Table 4 Operating Profits and Calculated Profits (in Current Dollars)
Model
Operating Profits with 
Player Costs
Operating Profits with 
Summary Expenses
Calculated Profits 
with Player Costs
Calculated Profits 
with Summary 
Expenses
F-statistic 12.36**** 11.60**** 9.62**** 9.72****
R-squared 0.39 0.36 0.44 0.38
Number of Observa-
tions
309 309 309
Ramsey RESET test F = 1.58 F = 1.87 F = 2.01 1.97
Cook-Weisberg test X2 = 1.42 X2 = 1.54 X2 = 1.79 X2 = 1.01
Variance Inflation 
Factor test
Mean VIF = 2.87 Mean VIF = 6.52 Mean VIF = 2.87 Mean VIF = 6.52
Dependent Variable Operating Profits Operating Profits Calculated Profits Calculated Profits
Independent Variables:
Constant -168,299*** -146,546*** -245,885*** -275,407***
Player Costs -0.655**** -.935***
Summary Expenses -1.09*** -0.450***
Summary Expenses 
Squared
5.88e-06***
CMSA or MSA 1,629* 1,346*** 2,434* 3,111**
Year Stadium Opened 93*** 86*** 136*** 149***
Year Indicator 1990 7,150**** 8,495**** 8,307**** 7,210****
Year Indicator 1991 9,267**** 10,835**** 12,872**** 9,944****
Year Indicator 1992 10,456**** 12,334**** 17,350**** 12,630****
Year Indicator 1993 17,708**** 17,381**** 24,752*** 14,186***
Year Indicator 1994 18,166**** 20,132**** 23,790**** 16,866****
Year Indicator 1995 20,312**** 22,389**** 25,573**** 18,171****
Year Indicator 1996 21,382**** 22,340**** 30,218**** 20,750****
Year Indicator 1997 23,257**** 24,749**** 32,351**** 23,577****
Year Indicator 1998 38,501**** 35,332**** 52,456**** 39,469****
Year Indicator 1999 39,599**** 31,872**** 61,352**** 44,132****
Significance: *—10% level; **—5% level; ***—1% level; ****—0.1% level.
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be adjusted. For instance, during the 1990s, an additional 
win yielded $1.14 million dollars of local revenue but 
also cost a franchise $752,685. Given that 60% of local 
revenues are kept by the franchise (with 40% being shared 
with other teams), the net revenues from an additional win 
(α* β) were $685,573. An analysis of equation (4) showed 
that the incremental change in profits from winning one 
more game (and having to share some of those revenues 
and incur the full cost of creating them) was -$67,112. 
This was consistent with the findings in Figures 1 and 2 
and Tables 3 and 4.
Discussion
Across NFL teams, there is a wide range of player payroll 
costs and summary expenses. Based upon the current data 
analysis, it appears that some NFL owners choose to free 
ride while others do not, with some spending more on 
players than maximizing profits would warrant. Overall, 
the purpose of the multiple methods used to investigate 
various definitions of expenses and various definitions 
of profit show that spending less produces higher profits 
(other than the U-shaped regression between adjusted 
operating profits and adjusted summary expenses). 
Empirically, the NFL is structured to slightly create the 
incentive to keep costs down by spending less. Theoreti-
cally, this is consistent with the notion that some teams 
will maximize profits (and spend less) while others will 
maximize wins (or some combination of the two) causing 
the relationship across the league to be downward sloping 
between profits and expenses.
The high spending owners are presumably sport-
focused owners. Another possible explanation for this 
behavior is the characteristic of a team’s market. Owners 
in larger markets, more so than owners in smaller markets, 
may spend more to create higher quality teams because 
it is in their economic interest (Gerrard, 2005; Késenne, 
2000; Rascher, 1997). Yet, the LOWESS graphs and 
regressions results show that this is not actually profitable, 
but instead only produces more wins. Only in one case is 
the profit versus expenses function U-shaped indicating 
that spending a lot or a little is most profitable, but being 
in the middle between the extremes is not. This coincides 
with the general finding in sport economics research that 
population is an important factor in determining demand. 
Therefore, an additional unit of quality for the product 
being sold will increase the actual demand for tickets 
(and related merchandise, concessions, etc.) by a larger 
number in a market with a higher population. Thus, there 
are more potential fans to be acquired by increasing team 
quality in a larger market.
While market characteristics do impact NFL profit-
ability, these characteristics do not completely explain the 
findings that some teams spend less on team quality but 
reap higher profits. The correlation between population 
and team expenses is positive and significant, but small 
(e.g., the correlation between population and summary 
expenses, team expenses, and player costs is 0.13, 0.30, 
and 0.14, respectively). In addition, higher costs in larger 
population centers might simply result from the higher 
cost of doing business in more urban areas.
A second possible explanation relates to each owner’s 
motivation. Certainly, each owner desires to experience 
on-field success and most owners would like to spend 
more on team quality to own a competitive sport team. 
In fact, many owners are able to spend more because they 
have significant wealth beyond their ownership of an NFL 
team. For example, Jim Irsay, owner of the Indianapolis 
Colts, sold personal stock and real estate holdings to pay 
$100 million in signing bonuses from 1999 through 2008 
(Burke, 2008). However, some owners may not have the 
desire or the ability to use outside funding sources. A 
number of owners have a large portion of their wealth 
invested in their NFL franchise and are more likely to 
treat their team as a profit-maximizing business. These 
owners might find it more profitable to free ride than to 
spend for a high performance team.
Table 5 Assessment of the Sensitivity of 
Revenues and Expenses to Winning
Model
Adjusted Local 
Revenues
Adjusted 
Summary 
Expenses
F-statistic 33.95* * * * 17.74* * * *
R-squared 0.10 0.06
Number of Obser-
vations
309 309
Dependent Vari-
able
Adj. Local Rev-
enues
Adj. Summary 
Expenses
Independent Vari-
ables:
Constant 32,420* * * * 76,496* * * *
Team Wins 1,142.6* * * * 752.7* * * *
Parameters:
α 0.61
β 1,142,6222
γ 752,6853
α * β 685,573
α * β  − γ -67,112
Significance: *-10% level; * *-5% level; * * *-1% level; * * * *-0.1% 
level.
1Based on the revenue sharing rules in the NFL during the 1990s.
2The coefficient on team wins is multiplied by 1,000 to account for 
Adjusted Local Revenues represented in thousands of dollars, not 
actual dollars.
3The coefficient on team wins is multiplied by 1,000 to account for 
Adjusted Summary Expenses represented in thousand of dollars, not 
actual
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An examination of NFL ownership during the 1990s 
demonstrates that free riding occurred in specific cases. 
Two of the teams that appeared to have been free riding 
the most were the Cincinnati Bengals and the Chicago 
Bears (see Table 6). In 1991, Mike Brown became the 
majority owner of the Bengals, a team that his father, 
Paul Brown, founded. The Chicago Bears were owned by 
Virginia McCaskey, team founder George Halas’s daugh-
ter. It is believed that their stake in the NFL constitutes 
the majority of their wealth (Ludwig, 2008; Mulligan, 
2007). The Pittsburgh Steelers, to a lesser extent, were 
also free riders during this time period. The Steelers were 
owned by Dan Rooney, the son of founder Art Rooney. 
From an efficiency perspective, the Steelers were able to 
succeed on the field (winning 10 games or more in five 
of the 11 seasons) with low expenditures compared with 
other NFL teams.
The Tampa Bay Buccaneers were, perhaps, the most 
egregious of all free riders. The Buccaneers were owned 
by Hugh Culverhouse until 1995, when Malcolm Glazer 
purchased the franchise. Clearly, Malcolm Glazer does 
not fit the mold of an owner whose primary financial 
investment is an NFL club as he is the 462nd wealthiest 
individual in the world (Kroll, 2008). Though it appears 
that some owners of “family-operated” teams appear to 
free ride for economic “necessity,” some wealthier owners 
may free ride for profit maximization.
Ultimately, the decision to potentially free ride is 
idiosyncratic and depends on the motivation of each 
owner. From the perspective of the league, however, 
having incentives to reduce payroll and on-field quality 
to the detriment of the rest of the league is problematic. 
It is in the interest of the league to establish policies that 
help keep costs under control while still maintaining qual-
ity and competitive balance. In particular, the salary cap 
and revenue-sharing policies help lower player salaries 
and other costs (e.g., team marketing costs). A problem 
exists when some teams are primarily carrying the burden 
of maintaining and growing the league’s brand (e.g., 
the Dallas Cowboys), while others are harming, or free 
riding on, the brand (e.g., the Cincinnati Bengals). From 
a league’s perspective, creating incentives to save costs 
is good, but allowing teams to reduce on-field quality to 
do so can be detrimental.
Until 2010, the NFL had a policy that forced teams 
to spend a minimum amount on player payroll (along 
with its player cap) yet free riding existed. With the 
owners opting to end the current CBA (Clayton, 2008), 
the salary floor and cap have been removed for at least 
the 2010 season. With the elimination of the salary 
floor, additional teams may now be inclined to free ride. 
Ultimately, this may harm the league’s brand reducing 
the value of the league as a whole and the value of its 
member franchises as well.
Teams also are not required to spend in other areas 
that impact quality such as scouting, coaching, training 
facilities, and staff. As it is likely not feasible to regulate 
all team expenditures, another solution, one that the 
league has recently implemented, is to exempt a majority 
of some revenue streams from the revenue-sharing pool. 
The NFL’s policy covering stadium-related revenues 
allows owners to keep almost all of the nonticket revenue 
generated by the stadium itself. Major League Baseball 
has enacted a similar policy. By allowing owners to retain 
a majority of stadium revenues, an incentive is provided 
for the owners to build new stadiums. Simultaneously, 
their motivation to field a competitive team increases so 
that the owner can then leverage the value of the new 
stadium (e.g., increase luxury suite and club seat sales). 
Other professional leagues face these same problems. 
However, these leagues share a lower percentage of their 
revenues so the problem is not as severe.
Ultimately the NFL has been extremely successful 
since its decision to equally share its national television 
revenues in 1960. John Mara, New York Giants co-owner, 
stated, “you could argue that we deserve a bigger piece 
of the pie, but it’s the reason that the NFL is the strongest 
professional league on the planet.” (Burke, 2003, para. 
4). The willingness to generously share revenues among 
NFL owners has contributed to the continual and rapid 
growth of league and team revenues and the league’s 
brand strength. However, the presence of free riding could 
undermine the league’s financial performance. The new 
revenue-sharing model that will be negotiated beginning 
in 2010 or 2011 may become even more important to the 
league as average team operating income was reduced 
24% since its peak during the 2002 season as a result of 
changes to the model under the 2006–2010 CBA (Baden-
hausen, Ozanian, & Settimi, 2008).
Table 6 Team Ranking of Profit Divided 
by Summary Expenses (Sorted Highest to 
Lowest)
Franchise and Ranking of Highest Profit divided by 
Summary Expenses
Year
Chicago 
Bears
Cincinnati 
Bengals
Pittsburgh 
Steelers
Tampa Bay 
Buccaneers
1989 2 5 6 1
1990 4 6 5 3
1991 2 5 1 3
1992 4 5 3 1
1993 1 2 3 7
1994 2 4 13 7
1995 4 8 11 2
1996 8 6 11 1
1997 15 8 10 1
1998 18 13 10 1
1999 18 14 9 5
Note. The NFL averaged 29 teams over the time period.
1 A conversation by one of the authors with an NFL team official 
revealed that the NFL is concerned that certain teams rely extensively 
upon the rest of the league to generate revenues, especially since some 
of those teams are extremely profitable.
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Directions for Future Research
While previous papers have investigated free riding and 
revenue sharing in professional sport, these papers have 
primarily focused on the impact of revenue sharing 
on competitive balance (Késenne, 2000; Palomino & 
Rigotti, 2000; Szymanski & Késenne, 2004) and atten-
dance (Fort & Quirk, 1995; Marburger, 1997; Rascher, 
1997; Vrooman, 1996). This paper has advanced existing 
knowledge regarding free riding in professional sport by 
directly examining the impact of free riding upon NFL 
franchise profitability. Moreover, it is the first article with 
such an extensive data set allowing a detailed understand-
ing of which owners free ride. Perhaps surprisingly, 
the free-riding teams are not the ones in small markets. 
Further, the need for expanding research related to free 
riding was called for by Lopatka and Herndon (1997) 
and Fort and Quirk (1995). However, there remain areas 
of investigation that should take place.
The causes of the observed free riding in the NFL 
should be closely examined especially, as the league 
prepares to negotiate a new CBA and develops a new 
revenue-sharing system. Perhaps there are systematic or 
structural reasons beyond each owner’s personal owner-
ship objectives that result in free riding. An analysis of 
the degree of revenue sharing each year and whether it is 
a significant predictor of free riding is warranted as well. 
Similar analyses of other leagues would help determine 
whether free riding is a widespread problem. Anecdotally, 
it appears that Donald Sterling, owner of the Los Ange-
les Clippers, free rides in the NBA (“#25 Los Angeles 
Clippers,” 2008). Various MLB teams also appear to free 
ride occasionally. After its success during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, the Oakland Athletics cut payroll and 
team quality significantly and business decisions became 
more driven by the pursuit of profits. Even though the 
team’s performance was poor, the ownership group was 
satisfied (Lewis, 2003).
Also, the recent increase in revenue sharing in MLB 
has uncovered a number of teams, such as the Milwaukee 
Brewers and Tampa Bay Rays, which were receiving 
revenue-sharing money while not improving the quality 
of their major league on-field product (Zimbalist, 2004). 
For example, the Milwaukee Brewers revenue-sharing 
portion grew from $2 million to $18 million between 
2002 and 2004. During the same timeframe, the Brewers’ 
payroll decreased from $50 million to $28 million, which 
was the lowest in MLB (Badenhausen, 2004). The Pitts-
burgh Pirates reportedly received nearly $18 million in 
revenue-sharing money in 2005, yet the team cut its pay-
roll approximately $25 million between 2001 and 2005. 
Kevin McClatchy, former majority owner of the Pirates, 
stated that he used his portion of revenue-sharing money 
to pay off existing debts and not to improve the team’s 
quality (Kovacevic, 2005). As a result of these ownership 
actions and given the drastic changes in revenue sharing 
that have taken place, a longitudinal analysis regarding 
revenue sharing in MLB needs to be undertaken.
The National Hockey League has historically shared 
little of its revenue. In 2003, it was reported that the 
league shared 9% of its revenue (“How the NFL levels…,” 
2003). The NHL’s poor economic model led to sufficient 
revenue disparities between teams to cause a player 
lockout that eventually canceled the 2004–2005 season. 
Under the new CBA with its players, a hard salary cap and 
floor was implemented as was increased revenue sharing 
(“Collective bargaining agreement…,” 2005). The NHL’s 
revenue-sharing plan requires teams to maintain a set 
attendance level to qualify for certain revenue-sharing 
payments. This, combined with a salary floor, ensures 
some effort to invest in team quality. Ultimately, every 
sport league needs to determine the optimal revenue-
sharing model to ensure league financial viability while 
also preventing free riding.
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